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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis deals with the performance of the Finnish banking sector in the late 
2000s global financial crisis. The aim of this thesis is to investigate the key factors 
in the successful performance of Finnish banks. These factors are brought to light 
by comparison to a British bank, Northern Rock, which experienced a banking run 
in 2007. This thesis also evaluates what the latest crisis has taught us about 
banking and its regulations, and whether the Finnish banking model could help to 
prevent future banking failures. The central theme of this study paper is that a 
bank‟s performance depends on its own strategic choices rather than external 
shocks. 
 
This thesis consists of two theoretical sections and one empirical section. The first 
theoretical section familiarizes the reader with the general structure of the banking 
environment, by clarifying the banking operations in the financial markets. The 
second theoretical section introduces the background of the late 2000s global 
financial crisis. The section then continues to the case of Northern Rock and 
finally gives an overview to the Finnish economy and banking performance. 
Within the empirical part, the key factors for the Finnish successful banking 
performance are then presented by themes deduced from the case of Northern 
Rock.  
 
The research method in this thesis is qualitative. In the research process, the data 
is collected using professional literature, case studies, annual reports, journals, 
news articles and discussion papers. The data in the empirical section is also 
collected in the form of a theme interview made to a banking professional. 
 
The late 2000s financial crisis revealed many risk concentrations in banks‟ 
business strategies. Banks that had been relying on wholesale funding were now 
left to face serious funding difficulties due to liquidity drying up in the money 
markets. In Finland banks have taken much more moderate risks and their deposit 
based funding strategies have proved to be stable even in market disruptions. The 
lessons from the 1990s banking crisis, banks‟ self regulation and acts of the 
supervisory authorities combined with a high level of public confidence have 
made Finnish banking sector one of the most efficient ones in the world.  
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TIIVISTELMÄ 
 
 
Tämä opinnäytetyö käsittelee suomalaisen pankkisektorin suoriutumista 2000-
luvun globaalin finanssikriisin aikana. Opinnäytetyön tarkoituksena on tutkia 
mitkä tekijät ovat olleet avainasemassa suomalaisten pankkien menestyksen 
takana. Nämä tekijät on tuotu esille vertailussa brittiläiseen Northern Rock -
pankkiin, joka koki talletuspaon vuonna 2007. Tämä opinnäytetyö arvioi myös 
sitä mitä viimeisin kriisi on opettanut pankkitoiminnasta ja sen sääntelystä ja 
voisiko suomalaisen pankkitoiminnan malli auttaa pankkien epäonnistumisien 
ehkäisemisessä. Tämän työn keskeinen teema on, että pankin suorituskyky on 
pitkälti riippuvainen sen omista strategisista valinnoista, eikä niinkään ulkoisista 
shokeista.  
 
Opinnäytetyö koostuu kahdesta teoreettisesta ja yhdestä empiirisestä osiosta. 
Ensimmäinen teoreettinen osio tutustuttaa lukijan pankkien toimintaan 
rahoitusmarkkinoilla. Toisessa teoreettisessa osiossa esitellään taustat 2000-luvun 
globaalille finanssikriisille. Osio jatkaa kulkuaan Northern Rock -pankin kriisin ja 
päättyy katsaukseen Suomen taloudesta ja pankkisektorin suoriutumisesta. Työn 
empiirisessä osiossa esitellään suomalaisten pankkien menestyksekkään 
suoriutumisen avaintekijät, teemoittain Northern Rock -pankin kriisistä johdetusti. 
 
Opinnäytetyössä hyödynnetään kvalitatiivista eli laadullista tutkimusmenetelmää. 
Tutkimusprosessissa tietolähteinä on käytetty ammattikirjallisuutta, case-
tutkimuksia, vuosikertomuksia, sanoma- ja aikakausilehtien artikkeleita, sekä 
keskustelupapereita. Lisäksi empiiristä osiota varten haastateltiin pankkialan 
asiantuntijaa. 
 
2000-luvun lopun finanssikriisi paljasti monia riskikeskittymiä pankkien 
liiketoimintastrategioissa. Aiemmin rahoituksensa tukkumarkkinoiden varaan 
laskeneet pankit, joutuivat nyt kohtaamaan vakavan rahoitusriskin 
rahamarkkinoiden likviditeetin kaikotessa. Suomessa pankit ovat olleet paljon 
maltillisempia riskinottajia ja niiden talletuksille perustuneet varainhankinnan 
strategiat ovat osoittautuneet vankoiksi jopa markkinahäiriöiden aikana. 1990-
luvun pankkikriisin opetukset, pankkien itsesääntely ja valvontaviranomaisten 
toimet, yhdistettynä vahvana vallitsevaan yleisön luottamukseen ovat tehneet 
suomalaisista pankeista rahoitusmarkkinoiden tehokkaimpia toimijoita. 
 
Avainsanat: finanssikriisi, pankkikriisi, sääntely, varainhankinta 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
 
In September 2007, the United Kingdom faced its first bank-run since the failure 
of Overend, Gurney and Co. in 1866, when around £3 billion of deposits were 
withdrawn from a medium-sized bank, Northern Rock (NR). (Llewellyn 2008, 
35.) In February 2008, Northern Rock was nationalised by the British Govern-
ment. After this in August 2008 German Commerzbank AG takes over Dresdner 
Kleinwort investment bank and in September 2008, the US investment company 
Lehman and Brothers files for bankruptcy. Banks and investing companies all 
over the world are announcing losses mostly linked to the US subprime mort-
gages. (CNN 2008.) 
 
Meanwhile in Finland The Federation of Finnish Financial Services reports that 
the international financial crisis has had its effects in Finnish banking groups, but 
the banking system faces difficulties from a more solid foundations, than many 
other countries (Federation of Finnish Financial Services 2009). Still in 2009, it is 
announced that “the Finnish banking stands on a solid footing” and the managing 
director of Federation of Finnish Financial Services, Piia-Noora Kauppi describes 
that the capital strength of banks is adequate (Federation of Finnish Financial Ser-
vices 2010). In 2011, Helsingin Sanomat publishes a news release “Bank of 
Finland and Finnish Financial Supervisory Authority: risk of banking crisis 
avoided in Finland” (Helsingin Sanomat 2011a). 
 
As is well known, the late 2000s financial crisis has had its effects all over the 
world. It has also been stated that the origin of this global financial crisis lays in 
US subprime mortgage markets (SPM) and a lack of public confidence in that 
particular mortgage asset class. As we go back to the case of Northern Rock, 
among many other banks and financial institutions, it might be claimed that it be-
came a victim of this turbulence (Llewellyn 2008, 36) originally taken place in the 
USA. However the interesting point is that, why Northern Rock was so heavily 
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exposed to the risks occurred, when at the same time the banks somewhere else, in 
this case in Finland, did survive without serious damages. 
 
The idea for this thesis was developed during the author‟s student exchange year 
in Scotland when she became acquainted with the studies about the latest global 
banking crisis and its effects in the UK banking environment. Especially the crisis 
of British bank, Northern Rock has been an interest of several case studies and has 
been mentioned often also in Finnish professional discussion papers and journals. 
Therefore it would be interesting to investigate if the reasoning for more success-
ful Finnish banking performance during the latest financial crisis could be found 
with an example of a foreign bank.  
1.2 Thesis objective, research questions and limitations 
 
This study seeks to point out the key factors for the successful performance of the 
Finnish banking groups, in the chain of events of the late 2000s global financial 
crisis. The key factors are brought into a light by comparing to the British bank, 
Northern Rock, which experienced a banking run in 2007, as a consequence of the 
spilling effect of the US subprime crisis. This thesis also aims to evaluate what the 
latest crisis has taught us about the banking and its regulations, and whether the 
Finnish banking model could help at preventing future banking failures. The re-
search questions of this thesis are as follows: 
 
 What were the key factors for the successful performance of Finnish bank-
ing institutions in the late 2000s global financial crisis?  
 What has the financial crisis taught us about banking and its 
regulation? 
 Could the Finnish banking model help to prevent future banking 
failures? 
 
In this study the Finnish banking sector is viewed as a whole, focusing on Finnish 
deposit-taking banks. The reason for this approach is chosen, because this thesis 
takes a look at the nature of Finnish banking as a whole rather than concentrating 
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only on one Finnish bank. Instead of viewing the UK banking sector as a whole, 
only the crisis of Northern Rock is viewed more closely, because it is assumed 
that the nature of this particular case highlights the key factors of Finnish banking 
success.  
 
The discussion is restricted to investigate the Finnish banking performance only in 
the light of those characteristics, which have been claimed to be crucial in the 
Northern Rock crisis. This thesis does not aim to investigate more deeply the na-
ture or the performance of the UK and Finnish economies, their housing markets, 
interest rate policies, or other, which might have had a clear effect, but are out of 
the context what comes to the aims of this thesis. The hypothesis of this study 
paper is that the bank‟s performance depends on its own strategic choices rather 
than external shocks. The reasoning for this can be found by evaluating the fac-
tors, which led to the banking run in Northern Rock. The role of the regulatory 
and supervisory authorities will be discussed in this thesis, but the wider legisla-
tive issues have been left out of consideration. 
1.3 Research methods 
 
In research, there are two broad methods of reasoning; the deductive and inductive 
approaches. Deductive reasoning works from the more general to the more spe-
cific, whereas inductive reasoning is moving from specific observations to broader 
generalizations and theories. (Burney 2008.) 
 
The theory part of this thesis requires becoming acquainted with several theories 
by assessing and evaluating what is relevant for the outcome of thesis and this 
way choose the most suitable approach to be used as a tool in empirical part. In 
this case, the most suitable method for reasoning would be deductive approach. 
 
For this study the most suitable research method is qualitative research, because 
the results are not attempted to be achieved by analysing numeric and statistical 
data, like in quantitative analysis, but instead by using words as a source of data. 
Also by approving Glenn‟s view, this thesis aims to understand why and how cer-
 5 
 
tain outcomes were achieved, as well as establishing what those outcomes were 
(Glenn 2010, 96). 
 
In research process, professional literature, case studies, annual reports and publi-
cations, press releases, journals, news articles and discussion papers are widely 
used when writing the theory part. This way in the theory part the data is secon-
dary data, and like Kothari describes, it is data which has already been collected 
by someone else (Kothari 2004, 96).  
 
The data of an empirical part consists of secondary data, like in theory part, but 
also primary data, like interviews, which are collected afresh and for the first time 
(Kothari 2004, 96). The sources of data in the empirical part are the same ones 
used in theory part, but in addition data is collected in the form of theme interview 
made to the Managing director of Koitin-Pertunmaan Osuuspankki (OP-Pohjola 
Group member bank).  
 
When looking through the student publications in Theseus, the Electronic Library 
of the Universities of Applied Sciences, it can be noticed that there have not been 
many earlier studies about the 2000s financial crisis and its impacts on banking 
sector. In turn there are several studies about the effects of the latest financial cri-
sis on corporates and trade, etc.  
 
The only thesis found, that has been dealing with the global financial crisis and 
banking crisis in a general level, has been published by Teemu Hirvelä in 2010. 
The study paper “Finanssikriisin syyt ja seuraukset sekä EKP:n rahapoliittinen 
elvytys” aims to evaluate the reasons behind the financial crisis and also the con-
sequences that followed. The paper also focuses on the monetary stimulation and 
its results pursued by the European Central Bank (ECB) in the light of the finan-
cial crisis (Hirvelä 2010).  
 
However, this thesis focuses only on the case of Northern Rock crisis and the per-
formance of Finnish banking sector. Also this thesis does not give such a wide 
view to the overall performance, but is rather to provide more specific reasoning 
for the performance of Finnish banking sector. 
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1.4 Thesis structure 
 
This thesis consists of two main parts; the theoretical part, which includes the 
chapters 2 & 3, and the empirical part with chapter 4. Chapter 2 familiarises the 
reader with the general structure of banking environment, by clarifying the bank-
ing operations in financial markets. Chapter 3 introduces the chain of events, 
which led to the global financial crisis and then moves to take a closer look at the 
collapse of one of the biggest banks in the United Kingdom, the case of Northern 
Rock. In this chapter also the 1990s Finnish banking crisis is introduced shortly 
and a general overview to the Finnish economy and banking performance is given. 
 
The empirical part of this thesis, chapter 4, presents implications for successful 
Finnish banking in the middle of financial turbulence. Within the empirical part, 
the key factors for the Finnish successful banking performance are presented by 
themes conducted partly from the case of Northern Rock. Research results are 
then followed by findings and conclusions part, which aims to answer to the re-
search questions given in the beginning. Finally the main aspects of this thesis are 
brought together in the separate summary-section. The structure of the thesis is 
showed in figure 1. 
 
 
FIGURE 1. Thesis structure 
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1.5 Related terminology 
 
 
Banking crisis  
 
Banking crisis can occur when individuals and companies lose confidence in the 
banking system. For example, this may be the result of an actual or expectations 
of potential run on the banking system. Any event, or chain of events, that leads to 
doubts about the solvency of the banking system can be considered a banking cri-
sis. (Casu, Girardone, Molyneux 2006, 471.)  
 
Subprime lending  
 
In subprime lending some party is lending to people who find it difficult to bor-
row from traditional sources, such as banks, because they are perceived to be a 
bad risk. Subprime loans carry a high rate of interest to compensate the lender for 
higher chance of default. (Gibson 2003, 286-287.) 
 
Bank run  
 
Bank run or banking run, means unusual heavy withdrawals by a bank's custom-
ers, normally sparked by fears that the bank may be in financial difficulties (The 
Financial Times Ltd 2011). The rumours about the banks financial difficulties can 
spread quickly, leading to that people want to be first in the line to withdraw their 
deposits, in the fear the bank will eventually run out of the currency (Jaffe 1989, 
according to Ruuskanen 2009, 145). Today‟s information technology enables 
modern banking runs, when customers are able to withdraw their funds via online 
banking (Ruuskanen 2009, 145). 
 
Interbank markets  
 
Interbank markets are markets where banks lend to or borrow from each other 
(Collin 2004, 185). Alternatively, when talking about interbank markets, it can 
also be used the term wholesale markets. Wholesale markets are interbank money 
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markets, where banks and other financial institutions deal with each other (Dic-
tionary of Economics 2006, 216). 
 
Moral hazard  
 
Moral hazard means a lack of incentive to guard against risk where one is pro-
tected from its consequences, for example by insurance (Oxford University Press 
2011). In moral hazard there is a danger that if a contract promises people pay-
ments on certain conditions, they will change their conduct so as to make these 
conditions more likely to occur. For example, moral hazard indicates that if pos-
sessions are fully insured, their owners are more likely taking less good care of 
them than if these possession were uninsured. (The Oxford Dictionary of Eco-
nomics 2011.)   
 
Liquidity risk  
 
Liquidity risk is defined as the risk that the institution does not have sufficient 
financial resources to meet its commitments when they fall due, or can secure 
them only at excessive cost (Lloyds Banking Group 2011). Liquidity risk occurs 
in the case of funding becoming impossible, in spite of that receivables would 
exceed payables (Taloussanomat 2011a). Banks, which liquidity reserves are di-
minishing, are easily driven into liquidity crisis. In this kind of situations, it is 
typical that rumours are making the funding more difficult. (Alhonsuo 2008, 9.) 
 
Funding risk  
 
Funding risk is further defined as the risk that the institution does not have suffi-
ciently stable and diverse sources of funding or the funding structure is inefficient 
(Lloyds Banking Group 2011). Funding risk occurs when receivables and pay-
ables mismatch. The spread between the receivables and payables is called fund-
ing risk. (Taloussanomat 2011b.)  
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2 BANKING OPERATIONS IN FINANCIAL MARKETS 
2.1 Financial intermediation  
 
In economic world, there are people who are wishing to lend (the ultimate lend-
ers) and others wishing to borrow (the ultimate borrowers) (Curwen 1997, 110). 
These ultimate lenders and borrowers are looking for each other to accomplish 
such a transfer which would satisfy their own financial needs; lenders want to lend 
to earn a profit for their savings, whereas the ultimate borrowers want to borrow 
to finance their own means.  
 
As Howells and Bain suggested, there are three different approaches for borrow-
ing and lending. These three approaches are summarised in Figure 2. 
 
   
FIGURE 2. Intermediation process   (Modified from Howells & Bain 2007, 1) 
 
Firstly, the borrowers and lenders may decide to deal directly with one another. 
Secondly, they may decide to go to organised markets, where lenders buy liabili-
ties issued by borrowers. However, there are many risks and uncertainties faced 
when entering this kind of money markets, where resources for monitoring the 
creditworthiness of borrowers and pooling funds are highly limited for an individ-
ual. Therefore borrowers and lenders may desire to use an alternative third ap-
proach and deal via intermediaries. This is when banks are coming into the picture 
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to act as financial intermediaries; to provide loans to borrowers and to collect de-
posits from savers. (Howells & Bain 2007, 1.)   
2.2 Financial markets 
 
Financial intermediaries operate in financial markets. As it was said in earlier sec-
tion, borrowers and lenders can choose to deal directly with one another or alter-
natively via intermediaries. This way financial markets can be divided into two 
different categories; direct finance, in other words securities markets, and inter-
mediated finance from credit institutions (Uusitalo & Pajarinen 2004, 6). The 
main function of financial markets is to channel funds between the financial sur-
plus and deficit units (Uusitalo & Pajarinen 2004, 6), in other words, accomplish 
intermediation process. In addition, the main functions of financial markets can be 
classified as follows: 
 
1. Passing on information. Without financial markets, it would be difficult 
for investors to compare the profits and risks between different invest-
ments. 
2. Diversifying risk. By diversifying investments to many places risk is re-
duced. 
3. Improving liquidity. Investors can withdraw their funds easily on de-
mand. 
 
(Uusitalo & Pajarinen 2004, 6.) 
 
In addition one of the functions of financial markets is to set the prices for differ-
ent funding instruments, as well as provide mechanisms for trading (Leppiniemi 
2009, 73). 
 
Those, who operate in financial markets, are trading with various financial in-
struments in securities markets, which can be also called equity and bond markets. 
The other markets financial institutions are trading in are called money markets. 
Securities markets are also known as capital markets and they are long-term fi-
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nance markets, whereas money markets are short-term finance markets. (Uusitalo 
& Pajarinen 2004, 6-7.) 
 
2.3 Main functions of banks 
As it was stated before, banks work as financial intermediaries between borrowers 
and savers. At its simplest, for banks the most important target has been to chan-
nel the funds from borrowers to lenders. There are also many other definitions for 
the core functions of banks, but they all seem to be based on the same idea.  
 
In his book “Pankkikriisi ja rahoitusmarkkinoiden sääntely”, Ruuskanen ap-
proaches the main function of banks via Urban‟s (1994) theory. According to Ur-
ban the main functions are divided into three categories, which are the re-
allocation of resources, division of risks and sustaining the general payment sys-
tem. (Ruuskanen 2009, 6.)  
 
In short, re-allocation of resources, means banks ability to allocate the funds be-
tween financial surpluses and deficits. So it is allocating the funds from financial 
surpluses to those parties, which have a demand for finance at the same time. A 
second important duty is risk management, and most importantly the division of 
risks between different parties who are operating in markets. The third final main 
duty is to sustain the general payment system in most efficient and secured ways. 
(Ruuskanen 2009, 6.) 
2.4 Banks‟ funding and profitability 
 
Banks can source funds in financial markets in form of public deposits and in 
much larger units from capital and money markets. In Finland deposits have tradi-
tionally been an important source of funding and households the biggest group of 
depositors. (Uusitalo & Pajarinen 2004, 28.) Other groups of depositors can be for 
example companies, insurance companies and other financial institutions and pub-
lic sector.  
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In addition to deposits, banks are receiving finance from the wholesale markets. 
Funds are collected by selling instruments such as certificates of deposits (CDs) in 
money markets and by selling bonds in capital markets. (Uusitalo & Pajarinen 
2004, 28.) 
 
During the last decades especially one type of source of funding started to become 
more common among the financial institutions. Through securitisation banks, in-
surance companies and other companies are transforming non-liquid assets into a 
liquid form (Bank of Finland, 2003), which can be then sold to the investors. In 
securitisation process, individual debts are sliced and repacked into new units, 
which allows them to be priced more cheaply and also diversify risks more 
widely, when these securities are passed on down the chain (Keasey & Veronesi 
2008, 9). Typical balance sheet item, which can be securitised, is a mortgage loan 
(Bank of Finland 2003).  
  
By intermediation process, banks make profits by charging a rate of interest to 
borrowers, which exceeds that which they pay to lenders (Howells & Bain 2007, 
25). The profits are affected highly by the relation between the amount of deposits 
and credits, and the difference between the interests paid and received for these 
two (Uusitalo & Pajarinen 2004, 30).  
 
The changes in the financial markets affect interest rates directly. During the re-
cession the interest rates go down and this decreases also banks‟ profits (Uusitalo 
& Pajarinen 2004, 33), when the interest margins between the loans and the de-
posits become smaller. 
2.5 Banking supervision and regulation 
 
Unlike many other businesses, banks are heavily regulated by governments. Su-
pervision and regulation of banking activities is essential especially because of the 
customers‟ trust in the banking environment. The history of banking supervision 
and regulation has its roots in the post-depression era, after the 1930s world reces-
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sion, when banks‟ failures became a concern and there was more intervention in 
regulation by the government. Consequently to maintain stability in the economy, 
several agencies and regulations have been established for supervising and moni-
toring banking activities. (Dilley 2008, 28.) 
 
Therefore, there are at least two central elements that are for banking supervision 
and regulation. The first element is maintaining the stability of financial system 
and that way secure the state of national economy. The second element is the need 
for customer protection by bank‟s customers‟ deposit insurance. (Ruuskanen 
2009, 17-18.)  
 
Most commonly in an economy, the elements of a regulatory structure are gov-
ernment‟s treasury, central bank and financial services authority. In the UK, the 
structure consists of HM Treasury (the UK‟s economics and finance ministry), the 
Bank of England (BOE) and Financial Services Authority (FSA) (Griffits & Wall 
2007, 418). In Finland, the regulatory structure is divided between The Ministry 
of Finance, the Bank of Finland (BOF) and the Financial Supervisory Authority 
(FIN-FSA) (Ministry of Finance 2011). 
2.5.1 Regulatory structure in United Kingdom 
 
The latest structural change will be faced in the UK‟s financial system in the near 
future. By now, the supervision and regulation have been distributed between the 
HM Treasury, the Bank of England and the Financial Services Authority. In 2010, 
the HM Treasury announced that the Coalition Government believes that the cur-
rent system of financial regulation has weaknesses and it will be replaced with a 
new framework that promotes responsible and sustainable banking (HM Treasury 
2011a). The following three sections will introduce the regulatory structure, as it 
exists currently and as it existed to be during the turmoil of the late 2000s global 
financial crisis. Nevertheless, in the last section also the new framework of the 
UK banking regulatory structure is introduced. 
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HM Treasury 
 
Her Majesty's Treasury, commonly known as HM Treasury, is the United King-
dom's economics and finance ministry and it is responsible for formulating and 
implementing the UK Government‟s financial and economic policy. In 2007, the 
two core strategic objectives were maintaining sound public finances, and ensur-
ing high and sustainable levels of economic growth. (HM Treasury 2007.) 
 
The responsibilities of the Treasury have been defined as follows: 
 
1. The overall institutional structure of financial regulation and the legisla-
tion, which governs it, including the negotiation of EC (European Parlia-
ment and Council) directives;  
2. Informing and accounting to Parliament for the management of serious 
problems in the financial system and any measures used to resolve them;   
3. Accounting for financial sector resilience to operational disruption within 
government. 
 
(Bank of England, FSA & HM Treasury 1998.) 
 
The Treasury has no operational responsibility for the activities of the FSA and 
the Bank of England, but there are a variety of circumstances where the FSA and 
the Bank will need to alert the Treasury about possible problems aroused. (Bank 
of England, FSA & HM Treasury 1998.) 
 
 
Bank of England 
 
The Bank of England is owned by the government (nationalised in 1946) and has 
a monopoly on the note issue in England and Wales. The Bank of England is 
committed to its two core purposes; promoting and maintaining monetary and 
financial stability as its contribution to a healthy economy. It also sets the UK‟s 
official interest rates, which are taken by the Monetary Policy Committee who 
judges them to meet the annual inflation rate targets set by the Chancellor of the 
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Exchequer. (Bank of England 2011.) In addition to the aforementioned, the Bank 
of England acts as a banker to the government and to other domestic banks and is 
a general overseer of the whole financial system (Casu, Girardone, Molyneux 
2006, 132). In order to prevent crisis it also has an important function of providing 
liquidity to the banks as a lender-of-last-resort (LOLR). 
 
The Bank of England faced major changes in 1997, when the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer announced the most important institutional and operational changes at 
the Bank since nationalisation in 1946. The first change was that the Bank of Eng-
land was given an operational responsibility for setting short-term interest rates to 
achieve an inflation target. Second, the banking supervision was transferred to an 
enhanced Securities and Investments Board. (Rodgers 1997, 241.) More specifi-
cally the regulatory power was given to the Financial Services Authority, estab-
lished later. Third, the Bank‟s role as the Government‟s agent for debt manage-
ment, in selling gilts, overseeing the gilts market and in cash management was 
transferred to the Treasury (Rodgers 1997, 241). Otherwise the Bank was pro-
posed to remain responsible for the overall stability of the financial system (Rod-
gers 1997, 241). 
 
 
Financial Services Authority 
 
The Financial Services Authority (FSA) is an independent non-governmental 
body, which was given statutory power by the Financial Services and Markets Act 
2000 (Financial Services Authority 2011). The regulatory objectives of the FSA 
are market confidence, financial stability, the protection of consumers and the 
reduction of financial crime (Parliament of United Kingdom 2000). In other 
words, the FSA‟s core functions are to maintain confidence in the UK‟s financial 
system, contribute to the protection and enhancement of stability of the UK‟s fi-
nancial system, secure the appropriate degree of protection of consumers and re-
duce the scope for financial crime among regulated businesses (Financial Services 
Authority 2011). 
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The FSA has the power of those acts, the Bank of England was executing before. 
The FSA is responsible for; prudential supervision of banks and non-banks, over-
all supervision of financial markets, conduct of operations in response to problem 
cases affecting firms and markets, and the regulatory policy in all the aforemen-
tioned areas (Bank of England, FSA & HM Treasury 1998). 
 
 
Regulatory reform of the United Kingdom’s financial system 
 
The new framework of financial regulation was born as a consequence of finan-
cial crisis. The Coalition Government believes that the system of financial regula-
tion is no longer suitable (HM Treasury 2011a). According to the new banking 
agenda the Financial Services Authority will be abolished and its supervisory 
powers transferred to the Bank of England (HM Treasury 2011b).  
 
The Bank of England is given control of a day-to-day prudential supervision of 
financial institutions through a new Prudential Regulatory Authority established 
by the Government. Secondly, a new Financial Policy Committee will be estab-
lished at the Bank of England. The purpose of the committee is to look across the 
economy at the macroeconomic and financials issues by recognizing the risks 
threatening the stability. Thirdly, there also will be a new Consumer Protection 
and Markets Authority established, which will be responsible for the control of 
financial firms. (HM Treasury, 2011b.) 
2.5.2 Regulatory Structure in Finland 
 
Historically in Finland, the regulatory structure has been distributed between the 
Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Finland. Among many other countries, also 
Finland has accepted the authority model, by establishing Financial Supervisory 
Authority (FIN-FSA), which has been responsible for the most supervisory acts 
previously undertaken by the Financial Supervision Authority and the Insurance 
Supervisory Authority, from the beginning of 2009 (Financial Supervisory Au-
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thority 2011). The combination of these three authorities still exists to be the regu-
latory structure of the financial markets in Finland. 
 
 
Ministry of Finance 
 
The Ministry of Finance (Valtiovarainministeriö) is part of the Government and 
responsible for the strategic policy in the financial markets, and banking and secu-
rities market legislation. By these operations it seeks to fulfil its main cores by 
developing the markets, ensuring their stability and efficiency, balancing the 
competition and enhancing the diversity and accessibility of financial services. 
(The Ministry of Finance 2011.) 
 
 
Bank of Finland 
 
The Bank of Finland‟s four core purposes are monetary policy and research, fi-
nancial supervision, banking operations and the maintenance of currency supply 
(Bank of Finland 2011). Since Finland is part of European Monetary Union and 
has adopted the euro currency it also follows the monetary policy rules of the Eu-
rosystem. Therefore Finland takes part in the maintenance of price stability and 
common monetary policy decision as a member of the European Central Bank‟s 
Governing council and this way the Governor of the Bank of Finland is one of the 
deciding on the interest levels set for the euro area (Bank of Finland 2011). 
 
The Bank of Finland has an important responsibility as a supervisory of financial 
system and macroeconomics, although the main authority responsible for the su-
pervision acts is the Finnish Financial Supervisory Authority. Therefore the Bank 
of Finland offers many macroprudential analyses and practises crisis management 
by assessing and evaluating the banking system constantly. As it is typical for the 
central banks, also the Bank of Finland acts as a lender-of-last-resort, if needed. 
(Bank of Finland 2011.) 
 
The Bank of Finland practises also banking operations and acts as a bank for the 
other domestic banks and its one of the main tasks is to secure the domestic finan-
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cial system‟s liquidity and handle payment transfers between banks (Bank of 
Finland 2011).  
 
The Bank of Finland practises the maintenance of currency supply, by issuing 
new euro bank notes and coins in Finland and does this by cooperating with com-
panies specialised in banking and cash distribution services (Bank of Finland 
2011). 
 
 
Financial Supervisory Authority  
 
The Finnish Financial Supervisory Authority started to operate in 2009 and be-
came responsible for the acts previously undertaken by the Financial Supervision 
Authority and the Insurance Supervisory Authority. The new established Financial 
Supervisory Authority was a response to the failure of financial institutions and 
supervisory authorities at preventing financial crisis. (Financial Supervisory Au-
thority 2011.) 
 
The objective and mission of the Financial Supervisory Authority is defined in the 
Act on the Financial Supervisory Authority. The activities of the authority are 
aimed at ensuring financial stability and the smooth operations of credit, insurance 
and pension institutions and maintain the public confidence in financial markets 
(Act of the Financial Supervisory Authority 2008). The Financial Supervisory 
Authority operates in connection with the Bank of Finland, but still has the power 
to make independent decision in its supervisory work (Financial Supervisory Au-
thority 2011). 
2.5.3 Basel I & II 
 
The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision was created at the end of 1974 by 
the G-10 countries and Luxembourg and Switzerland (Casu et.al 2006, 181), due 
to a common concern regarding the capital levels of internationally active banks 
(Webb 2007, 428). In July 1988, the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision 
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introduced 1988 Capital Accord, which has been later known as “Basel I” (Casu 
et.al 2006, 181). According to the Basel I, the minimum capital requirement is 8% 
of risk-adjusted assets (Ruuskanen 2009, 108). The formula for capital adequacy 
is provided in Figure 3. 
 
FIGURE 3. Basel I bank's capital ratio (Ruuskanen 2009, 108) 
 
Basel I received lots of criticism, because of its “one size fits for all” –approach 
and it basically provided only one option for measuring the appropriate capital of 
internationally active banks. However, the best way for measuring, managing and 
mitigating the risks differs from bank to bank, and this is why a new approach for 
Basel was needed. (Secretariat of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
2004, 1.) 
 
The new framework was called Basel II. It intended to put more emphasis on 
banks‟ own internal methodologies, supervisory review and market discipline, to 
be more flexible and this way enhance the risk management of the banks. By add-
ing the operational risk in the picture it gave more space for banks for risk meas-
urement and determination of their capital level. (Secretariat of the Basel Commit-
tee on Banking Supervision 2004, 2.) The Basel II formula is shown in Figure 4. 
 
FIGURE 4. Basel II bank's capital ratio (Secretariat of the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision 2004, 3) 
  
In Basel II, the Basel Committee has made available two broad approaches: a 
foundation and an advanced. Under the foundation approach, banks provide their 
own estimates of PD (probability of default) and rely on supervisory estimates for 
other risk components. Under the advanced approach, banks provide more of their 
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own estimates of PD (probability of default), LGD (loss given default) and EAD 
(exposure at default), and their own calculation of EM (Effective maturity), sub-
ject to meeting minimum standards. (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
2004, 55.) This way the advanced approach allows banks to put more emphasis on 
their own risk assessments. 
2.5.4 Deposit protection scheme  
 
The original purpose of the deposit protection insurance was first introduced in 
the USA in the 1930s and established to remove the incentive to withdraw depos-
its from solvent banks when other banks were failing (Llewellyn 2008, 46). Later 
on it has been developed to protect consumers and their deposits. In Finland the 
deposit protection is mentioned in deposit bank legislation (Mutikainen 1998, 41). 
The deposit protection is also crucial to the general public‟s trust in the banking 
system. The reason for its crucial role lies in the argument, that one bankruptcy 
can place the entire financial system at risk. This is possible due to following rea-
sons: 
 
1) The reactions of foreign investors are unpredictable;  
2) The risks generally involve the entire banking system and not only one 
bank;  
3) There is the danger of the so-called domino effect. In other words, the 
bankruptcy of one bank may lead to great difficulties, even for healthier 
banks, if investors lose trust.  
 
(Mutikainen 1998, 41.) 
 
However, the granting of such a support than deposit guarantee involves numer-
ous practical and ideological problems. One of them is the argument that the gov-
ernment funding is never without its limits and the amount of support never can 
exceed the absolute essential. (Mutikainen 1998, 41.) Again if the coverage is 
total, serious moral hazard problems arise. Llewellyn (2008) presented at least the 
following three arguments for the problem of having a full coverage; firstly de-
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positors do not have incentive to consider the riskiness of their banks, secondly 
they might have incentivises to seek out high-risk banks because of the higher 
interests and if the bank failed, they still would be compensated, thirdly banks 
might have incentives to choose high-risk profiles, because they know the deposi-
tors are protected in the event of failure. (Llewellyn 2008, 46.) 
 
 
 
Deposit protection scheme in Finland 
 
Authorized Finnish deposit-taking banks are members of the Deposit Guarantee 
Fund. In 2008, deposits protection guaranteed deposits up to 25,000€. The protec-
tion scheme covers all private individuals, companies and associations with de-
posits in banks operating in Finland. Foreign banks‟ subsidiaries operating in 
Finland are protected by the protection system of the parent company‟s country. 
Foreign branches operating in Finland were guaranteed up to 20,000€, but accord-
ing the Finnish legislation the protection of foreign branch offices in Finland, 
must not be worse than Finnish banks‟ protection. To receive such a protection, 
the bank must apply to the fund for additional protection. (Helsingin Sanomat 
2011b.)  
 
At the end of 2010, the deposit guarantee was raised up to 50,000€. The latest 
limits were agreed Europe-wide at the start of the year 2011 for each country, in-
cluding Finland, to offer compensation equivalent to 100,000€ (Bank of Finland 
2011, 26). 
 
 
Deposit protection scheme in the United Kingdom 
 
In the UK, the deposit protection fund is maintained by the Financial Services 
Compensation Scheme (FSCS). The FSCS covers the deposits of the firms author-
ised by the Financial Services Authority. (Financial Services Compensation 
Scheme 2011.) 
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In 2007, the deposits in the United Kingdom were guaranteed up to £31,700 per 
person, made up of 100 % of the first £2,000 and then 90 % of their next £33,000. 
In October 2007, the protection was raised to £35,000 and a year later in October 
2008 to £50,000. (BBC 2010.) The latest change extended the guarantee to cover 
the deposits up to £85,000, in 2011. The deposit insurance policy covers all de-
posits with the UK deposit takers and subsidiaries of foreign banks, which operate 
in the UK. The deposits in branches of foreign EEA (European Economic Area) 
banks operating in the UK, are covered by the scheme of the country where the 
parent company operates. (Directgov 2011.) 
2.5.5 Credit rating agencies 
 
Credit rating agencies are evaluating the creditworthiness of a debt or debt issuer. 
Credit ratings can be given to different types of short- and long-term bonds and 
other financial instruments. Agencies are evaluating the creditworthiness of com-
panies, banks and states, by using the same rating scale. Usually there are 20 dif-
ferent kind of creditworthiness classes. The best rating is “AAA” and the worst 
one “C” or “D”. The three largest credit rating agencies operating worldwide are 
Fitch, Moody‟s and Standard & Poor‟s. (Valtiovarainministeriö 2011.) Standard 
& Poor‟s and Moody‟s rating scale is presented in table 1. 
 
TABLE 1. Standard & Poor‟s and Moody‟s rating scale (Modified from Lep-
piniemi 2009, 185) 
Standard 
& Poor's 
Moody's 
  
Grade Grade Explanation 
AAA Aaa Highest quality 
AA Aa High quality 
A A Upper medium grade 
BBB Baa Medium grade 
BB Ba Predominantly speculative 
B B Speculative, low grade 
CCC Caa Poor to default 
CC Ca Highest speculation 
C C Lowest quality, no interest 
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However, the ratings given by the agencies do not provide guidance on other as-
pects essential for investment decisions, such as market liquidity or price volatil-
ity. Also, even though the regulatory standards have been predicated on credit 
ratings, there has been only little oversight of how the ratings actually are made. 
(Katz, Salinas, Stephanou, 2009, 1-2.) As a consequence of the latest financial 
crisis also the credibility of credit rating agencies has been widely questioned. 
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3 BANKING CRISIS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 
 
3.1 Background of the late 2000s financial crisis 
The late 2000s financial crisis started to emerge in 2006, when the US housing 
markets faced their downturn after the years of growth. The roots of the emerging 
crisis lie down much further in time. There are at least three main factors, which 
accelerated the birth of the crisis. Firstly, the growing house markets were fi-
nanced by so called subprime mortgages, secondly at the time financial institu-
tions had been accepting new methods such as securitisation and short-term fund-
ing as a business strategy, thirdly within the globalisation of financial sector, it 
would be sure that everything that occurs in the markets will have spilling effects 
all over the world. 
 
In the 21
st
 century there had been an upward trend in the USA (and other coun-
tries, e.g. Ireland) housing markets. It has been speculated that in the USA, the 
political pressure about the “ownership living” had been reducing the risk aver-
sion in the housing markets (Hirvensalo, Kariniemi, Leppänen, Morén & Puu-
malainen 2009, 22). The Government was boosting the economy by new money 
injections and consequently there were loads of subprime money available for the 
mortgage markets. Therefore financial institutions started to grant credits with a 
high leverage of debt, and eventually, the mortgages were available even for those 
who could not have afforded them (Hirvensalo et.al 2009, 26) and without any 
sufficient collateral.  
 
The whole market turmoil of the late 2000s became deeper, when banks started to 
bring together their assets, e.g. mortgages, into a single package and selling the 
portfolio into the capital markets. These portfolios were bought by other financial 
institutions or structured investment vehicles (SIVs) or Conduits established by 
the securitising bank itself. The buyers issued securities, such as asset-backed 
commercial papers and long-term papers, and this way the banks passed the loans 
to others. (Llewellyn 2008, 37.) Most of these kind of mortgage-backed securities 
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ended up to be in so called shadow banking system, which consisted mainly of 
investment banks outside of the banking regulation (Hirvensalo 2009, 24). 
 
Finally the financial crisis emerged when the US housing markets collapsed, 
therefore leaving financial institutions holding assets sharply decreased in value. 
There was a lack of public confidence, when no one knew who was holding these 
“toxic assets”.  
 
The loss of public confidence caused by the failure of many investment banks led 
to the funding in interbank markets drying up. Consequently all the other institu-
tions operating in the markets, and which were financing their operations with 
short-term borrowing faced a serious funding risk (Hirvensalo et.al 2009, 25). 
And because in today‟s globalised world many banks are financing their means 
with overseas borrowing, the US subprime crisis was able to spread all over the 
world quickly. 
 
The US housing markets had their spilling effects in spite of that all the institu-
tions were not even holding these toxic assets on their balance sheets. Due to the 
loss of confidence in the mortgage markets, banks faced difficulties to finance 
their own assets in capital markets with instruments as asset backed commercial 
papers.  
 
What made the born crisis even deeper was that like the USA, also the UK and 
many other East European countries had been living for debt by increasing the 
government deficit (Hirvensalo et.al 2009, 20). One of the main characteristics for 
the countries in crisis, was that the banking sectors were highly dependent on the 
foreign financing. However in these cases, the financial state of the public sector 
did not create an image about sufficient collaterals, so that the deficit countries 
would be able to support their own banking sector with domestic taxes (Hirven-
salo et.al 2009, 26). 
 
Due to the doubts about the soundness of banking institutions and governments‟ 
capability to secure the markets, the interbank markets dried up. This chain of 
events led to the problems among all the banks that had a securitisation process as 
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a business model and for which the interbank markets were an important source of 
funds. This way also the problems for the UK‟s eighth largest bank and fifth larg-
est mortgage lender (Hall 2008, 20), Northern Rock, arose. 
3.2 Crisis of Northern Rock: crucial factors 
 
The Northern Rock, a former building society, was converted to bank status in 
1997. The UK‟s fifth largest mortgage lender was run into financial difficulties 
when it faced serious funding problems due to the close up of interbank lending.  
 
On 13
th
 of September 2007, the Bank of England reports that it has activated the 
function of lender-of-last-resort for Northern Rock (IDNM 2008) causing the 
bank‟s shares crash more than 30% on following day (Reuters Limited 2011). 
During the following days of the announcement, the Northern Rock had paid out 
£2 billion (later increased to £10 billion) when depositors rushed to withdrawn 
their savings in a fear of bank‟s failure. Consequently, the bank faced a banking 
run and eventually Treasury announced a full guarantee of Northern Rock‟s exist-
ing deposits in an attempt to stem the deposit run on the bank and restore financial 
confidence (Hall 2008, 22-23). Despite the rescue operations, the Northern Rock 
was nationalised in February 2008. 
3.2.1 Business model of Northern Rock 
 
There have been several case studies about the crisis of Northern Rock. Although 
in those studies, the quality of the Northern Rock‟s assets has never been ques-
tioned, it still was exposed to many other risks. Due to its operations and business 
model chosen, it quickly became one of the victims of the late 2000s financial 
crisis. Llewellyn (2008) presented the following arguments (among other things) 
for the collapse of the Northern Rock: 
 
1) “NR had a unique business model, where securitisation had a central part of 
the bank‟s overall business strategy. Many banks securitise assets at the mar-
 27 
 
gin, but for Northern Rock the securitisation and reliance of short-term market 
funding were the central features of its business model. 
 
2) A crucial feature of this business model was that it exposed the bank to a low-
probability-high-impact (LPHI) risk. The bank became heavily dependent on 
short-term funding in the money and capital markets, while no one predicted 
that liquidity in the markets would suddenly disappear.  
 
3) While the business model was successful for some years, the LPHI risk even-
tually emerged as a consequence of global financial turbulence focused ini-
tially on SPM lending in the USA. As Northern Rock had no part in this it 
might be claimed that it became a victim of this turbulence. However, its ag-
gressive securitisation based business model and reliance on short-term fund-
ing exposed the bank to a LPHI risk associated with a drying-up of liquidity in 
the financial markets.” 
 
(Llewellyn 2008, 36.) 
 
The nature of Northern Rock‟s business model can be seen on its mid-term bal-
ance sheet for 2007, where the assets stood at £113.5 billion at the end of June, 
with mortgages comprising £87.9 billion (Hall 2008, 20). In turn, only £30.1 bil-
lion of liabilities were represented by customer deposits (Hall, 2008, 20), indicat-
ing that the deposits were not a very important source of finance. Instead of that 
NR sourced its funding from the interbank markets and by securitisation markets.  
3.2.2 Failure of regulation 
 
The crisis of Northern Rock created many implications about the failure of the 
UK‟s financial regulation authorities. In case studies, the government, the Bank of 
England, FSA and credit rating agencies had their part in the chain of events 
which led to the collapse of Northern Rock.  
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The main fault-line led to the crisis was the NR‟s business model, which exposed 
it to a LPHI risk. What emerges is that the supervisors of the bank did not address 
this feature of the bank‟s strategy with sufficient rigour, although both the Finan-
cial Services Authority and the Bank of England had for several months been 
making general warnings about liquidity risk. (Llewellyn 2008, 37.) 
 
Another major fault-line was that the pace of lending substantially exceeded the 
growth of retail deposits. As Llewellyn claimed, neither banks nor the supervisory 
authorities were sufficiently attuned to the liquidity risk implied by these trends 
(Llewellyn 2008, 37). 
 
There has also been lots of conversation about the British deposit protection and 
the acts of Bank of England concerning the way it was handling the case in public. 
Llewellyn stated that the crisis has clearly shown, the failure at reading the situa-
tion as is developed and also failure at communication across the key organisa-
tions, as Treasury, FSA and BOE. After the announcement of the LOLR-support 
operation retail depositors withdrew funds from NR on a large-scale, implicating 
that the depositors were not convinced by the bank‟s solvency. This happened 
even though the FSA had judged Northern Rock to be solvent, exceeding its regu-
latory capital requirement, and holding a good quality loan book. Only after then 
government announced a full guarantee of all deposits, the drain ended. (Lle-
wellyn 2008, 41.) 
 
Also what has been stated was the supervision failure, what comes to the fulfilling 
the criteria of the Basel II. As it was explained in earlier chapter, there are two 
possible approaches to choose in Basel II, where the advanced approach puts more 
focus on bank‟s internal regulations and own estimations of risks. With an ap-
proval of the FSA, the Northern Rock was able to use advanced approach (Rochet 
2008, 6).  
 
As a consequence NR‟s capital requirement was actually reduced by Basel II, re-
sulting in surplus capital, which made the bank increase its dividend. The FSA 
was allowing Northern Rock to do this and weaken its balance sheet, even though 
the FSA itself had doubts about the liquidity of financial sector. The Basel II is a 
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capital accord and the problems of NR were handling liquidity. However, the in-
creased dividend only weakened the situation even more. (The House of Com-
mons and Treasure Committee 2008, 25.)  
3.3 Overview to the Finnish banks in financial crisis 
 
This section aims to clarify the history of the Finnish banks in financial crisis, as 
well as give an overall picture about the recent state of Finnish economy and 
banking sector in the turbulence of the late 2000s financial crisis. Historical over-
view to the earlier Finnish banking crisis is essential for understanding the current 
state of Finnish banking sector. To get more realistic picture about the Finnish 
banking performance, it is good to become acquainted also with the negative ef-
fects of the crisis in Finnish economy and financial markets. 
3.3.1 Historical review to the Finnish banking crisis 
 
The late 2000s financial crisis is not one of its kind for Finland. In the beginning 
of 1990s Finland faced its worst financial crisis in history, since the 1930s big 
recession. Due to the 1990s Finnish banking crisis, the banking sector of Finland 
faced a major structural reform, where the government had a crucial role 
(Ruuskanen 2009, 103).  
 
The 1990s Finnish banking crisis occurred after the years of fast economic growth 
and its reasons have been stated to be in excessive granting of credits in the end of 
1980s which led to companies and households ending up deeply in debt. This in-
dicated also that the whole public economy of Finland was living for debt borrow-
ing from abroad. (Ruuskanen 2009, 55.) The increased granting of credits was a 
consequence of on-going European integration process. To achieve the possibili-
ties in free capital movement, Finland started its deregulation process of the finan-
cial market gradually in the 1980s as part of a corresponding development in other 
market economies. However, Finland was already lagging behind most other mar-
ket economies in the deregulation process. (Mutikainen 1998, 7.) The time period 
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between the deregulation and reform of the new banking regulation created a 
normative gap, and banks were taking advantage of the situation by increasing 
granting of credits (Ruuskanen 2009, 56).  
 
In 1989, Finland faced the collapse of housing markets (Ruuskanen 2009, 60), 
which was unquestionably remarkable factor at causing the crisis, when banks‟ 
excessive credit granting started to revenge itself by rapidly increasing credit 
losses. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 had a crucial role, when the ex-
porting trade with Russia dropped down, taking Finnish exporting companies into 
financial difficulties. Ruuskanen refers to Honkapohja (2009), and states that the 
collapse of the trade between Russia and Finland was probably the most remark-
able factor at causing 1990s recession. (Ruuskanen 2009, 57.)  
 
Afterwards it has been stated that the US subprime crisis has been following the 
same format than the 1990s Finnish banking crisis (Hassi 2008). In both situa-
tions, the crisis was born as a consequence of loosening the fiscal policy, which 
led to the rapid increase of debt. 
 
One of the events, which caused the intervention of the Finnish government in 
1991, was the time when it became clear that the Finnish bank‟s, Säästöpankkien 
Keskus-Osake-Pankki (Skopbank), risk taking had exceeded the financial toler-
ance. The bank also had admitted to have liquidity problems due to the dried up 
short-term funding in the Finnish interbank markets. Soon the lack of confidence 
in the markets started to concern also saving banks. (Ruuskanen 2009, 104.) The 
problems occurred among the banking institutions, led to the structural reform of 
the banking sector. Consequently the authorities were forced to take special, and 
indeed exceptional, measures, such as takeovers, government assistance and tem-
porary blanket guarantees to banks, to secure the stability of the financial system 
(Ministry of Finance 2008). 
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3.3.2 Effects of the late 2000s financial crisis in Finnish economy and 
banking sector 
 
The effects of the global financial crisis can clearly be seen in Finnish economy. 
However, before the crisis the economy of Finland was growing fast. Public fi-
nance was surplus and GDP had been growing approximately by 4 % yearly, be-
tween 2004 and 2007.  In turn export business was growing by 9 %, private in-
vestment by 6 % and shares by 17 % yearly. (Freystätter & Mattila 2011, 7.)  
 
After the crisis hit Finland in 2008, the GDP of the country decreased sharply, 
even by 8 % in 2009. Also the export business (decreased by 20 %) and private 
investments dried up (decreased by 17 %). As a consequence of recession, the 
public finance turned out to be deficit in 2009 and the public debt started to grow 
sharply. (Freystätter & Mattila 2011, 4-14.)   
 
In 2008 the effects of financial crisis were seen in the Finnish financial markets. 
In the lack of liquidity and investors‟ confidence in the markets, the profits of the 
banks decreased and the credit failures started to generalise. This made banks to 
tighten their credit granting and consequently company financing became more 
difficult. (Freystätter & Mattila 2011, 4-14.)  In figure 5, it can be seen that loans 
to non-financial corporations have been decreasing rapidly between the years 
2008 and 2009. 
 
 
FIGURE 5. Euro-dominated loans to households and non-financial corporations 
(Modified from Kallonen 2011, 6) 
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Financial crisis has decreased Finnish banks‟ profitability. Reasons for decline in 
profits have diminished net interest income and impairment losses from loans and 
other commitments (Kallonen 2009, 14). Also the competition between the Fin-
nish banks has been pushing banks‟ interest rate margins down (Kallonen 2010, 
2). In figure 6, we can see how the margin between loan and deposits interest rates 
has been decreasing within the years. However, the profitability of Scandinavian 
countries, rest of the Europe and the USA has been weaker than Finnish banks‟ 
performance. Also, the share of the increased credit losses from the total loans has 
been small. Therefore their impact on banks‟ profitability has not been so remark-
able. (Alhonsuo et. al, 2008, 16-17.) 
 
 
FIGURE 6. Margin between load and deposit interest rates  (Kallonen 2011, 12) 
 
Despite the negative effects of global financial crisis in Finnish economy, the 
banking sector has remained rather stable (Freystätter & Mattila 2011, 14). 
Strength of the Finnish financial institutions has been that the banks were on a 
sound base before the worldwide crisis occurred. The capital adequacy of the 
banks has been good and the share of low quality balance sheet items also small. 
(Kauppi, 2010.) The positive growth before the crisis has this way improved Fin-
nish banks‟ solvency (MD of Koitin Pertunmaan Op 2011). The capital adequacy 
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ratio of Finnish banks has been high yearly, even after the new Basel II accord, 
which let banks to put more emphasis on their own risk assessments. For example 
in 2009 and 2010, the capital adequacy ratios of banks operating in Finland were 
14.4% and 14.5% (Kallonen 2011, 14). Financial crisis has affected mostly the 
company sector by making their financing more difficult (Freystätter & Mattila 
2011, 14). 
 
Overall, the financial solvency and liquidity of the Finnish banks and other finan-
cial institutions has remained on a good state compared on an international level. 
The Finnish banks have not been in a need of reorganise their debt level, like 
many other foreign banks. (Freystätter & Mattila 2011, 14.) 
 
This chapter provided a general overview about the effects of latest financial crisis 
in Finnish economy and banking sector. As it can be seen, the latest financial cri-
sis has had its effects in Finnish economy, but it has not been shaking the balance 
of Finnish banking sector in the same way than in many other countries. In the 
following empirical study we take a closer look at the reasons behind the success-
ful Finnish banking performance. More specific implications can be presented 
when we take a look at the Finnish banks‟ performance from the point of view of 
the crisis of Northern Rock.  
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4 CASE STUDY: KEY FACTORS OF FINNISH BANKING SUCCESS 
4.1 Research process 
 
In the first part of the theory (chapter 2) in this thesis the reader has become ac-
quainted with the central concepts of banking operations in financial markets. The 
reader got an overall picture about the structure of financial markets and how 
banks are operating in those markets, by acting as intermediates between lenders 
and borrowers. It was also taken a look at that how banks are funding their opera-
tions and how they are regulated and supervised in the markets.   
 
In the second part of the theory (chapter 3), we took a look at the causes and con-
sequences of the latest financial crisis in the banking sector. First we clarified the 
background of the crisis and then moved to the more specific study by introducing 
the case of Northern Rock. The last sections of chapter 3 introduced the 1990s 
Finnish banking crisis and gave an overview about the impact of the latest finan-
cial crisis to the Finnish economy and banking sector 
 
After these two chapters the research is ready to move to the empirical part of this 
thesis, which aims to clarify the Finnish banking performance in the late 2000s 
financial crisis, as well as looking answers for the sub questions set in the begin-
ning of this thesis.  
4.2 Comparative study: Northern Rock against the Finnish banking sector 
 
In this section the key factors for successful Finnish banking performance are ap-
proached from four different aspects or themes, which are; Banks’ funding and 
lending strategies, Deposit protection scheme, The lessons from the 1990s Finnish 
banking crisis and Public confidence. The themes stem from the crisis of Northern 
Rock and they can be justified as follows: 
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1) In the case of Northern Rock, it became clear that the bank‟s aggressive fund-
ing and lending strategies were exposing it to the many risks in the markets. 
Therefore the first theme is dealing with Finnish bank‟s funding and lending 
strategies 
 
2) Another major fault line in Northern Rock‟ concerned the British deposit pro-
tection scheme and regulatory authorities failure at handling the situation. 
Therefore the second theme discusses about Finnish deposit protection 
scheme.  
 
3) The third theme deals with the 1990s Finnish banking crisis. This is differing 
from the other themes, but still considered to be essential when evaluating the 
key factors behind the successful Finnish banking performance during the lat-
est crisis.  
 
4) The final theme discusses the importance of public confidence, since this ob-
viously had a crucial role in the crisis of Northern Rock. Therefore the last 
theme analyses the role of the pubic confidence in Finnish banking markets.  
 
The information concerning the themes is gathered from publications, news arti-
cles and by a theme interview with Managing Director of one of the local OP-
Pohjola Group member banks. In text the interviewee is referred as a MD of 
Koitin Pertunmaan Op. The interview was held on 16
th
 of August 2011. The body 
for the theme interview can be found in appendix 1 in the end of this thesis (ap-
pendix 1). 
4.2.1 Banks‟ funding and lending strategies 
 
Traditionally public deposits have had a central role in source of funding for Fin-
nish banks (Uusitalo, 2004, 28). What was notable in Northern Rock‟s case was 
that, as a proportion of the total liabilities and equity, retail deposits and funds had 
fallen from 62.7% at end-1997 to 22.4% at end-2006 (the UK Parliament 2011). 
Figure 7 shows the balance sheet structure of Finnish deposit taking-banks‟ in the 
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end of the year 2008. There, it can be seen that the deposits from the public had 
slightly more than one third of the liabilities still during the year of 2008. In his-
tory the deposits have been more than this, comprising almost half of the banks‟ 
balance sheets (Uusitalo 2004, 2008).  
 
 
 
FIGURE 7. Balance sheet structure of Finnish deposit-taking banks (Kallonen 
2009, 14) 
 
Banks lending and funding strategies can also be evaluated by comparing the 
banks‟ deposit base to the amount of loans. The relation between the Northern 
Rock‟s loans to the customers and the deposits in customer accounts can be seen 
in figure 8, which demonstrates bank‟s mid-term balance sheet structure for 2007. 
The figure is produced by the information gathered from Northern Rock‟s statu-
tory consolidated balance sheet, from page 19, of “Northern Rock, Interim Re-
sults, 6 Months Ended 30 June 2007”. Also, as it was stated before, the assets of 
Northern Rock stood at £113.5 billion, with mortgages comprising £87.9 billion, 
whereas only £30.1 billion of liabilities were represented by customer deposits. 
This would indicate that only 34 % of mortgage lending was covered by the retail 
deposits.  
 
In turn, for Finnish banks deposits have been the most important source of financ-
ing, covering most of their lending. This can also be seen in figure 7. The share of 
deposits as a source of funding has been high yearly, for example in 2010, even 80 
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% of Finnish deposit-taking banks‟ lending was covered by deposits (Kallonen 
2010, 10). For local cooperative banks the meaning of deposits as a source of fi-
nancing can be even bigger and lending can be covered fully by the amount of 
deposits (MD of Koitin Pertunmaan Op 2011). 
 
 
FIGURE 8. Northern Rock‟s balance sheet structure June 2007 
 
The soundness of banks‟ funding and lending strategies can also be described by 
comparing the difference between the growth of deposits and growth of lending. 
What was notable in the case of Northern Rock is that the pace of lending substan-
tially exceeded the growth of retail deposit, leading to that the bank started to bor-
row more money from the wholesale markets to cover its lending.  
 
TABLE 2. Euro-denominated deposits to Finnish Monetary Financial Institutions 
(Federation of Finnish Financial Services 2011, 5) 
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In table 2 and 3 we can see that the deposits and loans have both been increasing 
substantially in Finnish banking institution. From 2005 to 2010, deposits have 
grown approximately 30 % and loans 33 %. Therefore in Finnish banks, the 
growth of deposit has been following the pace of lending. 
 
TABLE 3. Euro-denominated lending by Finnish Monetary Financial Institutions 
(Federation of Finnish Financial Services 2011, 5) 
 
 
The fast growth of deposits during the crisis is explained by that the households 
started to transfer their assets from higher-risk investments, such as equity shares 
and investment funds, into safer bank deposits (Bank of Finland 2011, 26). This 
way banks‟ deposit base has actually increased as a consequence of the financial 
crisis and balanced the pace of lending.  
 
Liquidity problems are faced especially by the banks, which are dependent on 
short-term money markets due to the small deposit base (Bank of Finland 2008, 
20). What was characteristic for Northern Rock‟s business model is that instead of 
sourcing short-term funding from retail customer base, it was heavily relying on 
short-term funding in wholesale markets. The problems will arise most likeably, if 
the bank is holding a low credit rating or it cannot be trusted from some another 
reasons (Bank of Finland 2008, 20). As it was established before, it was not the 
quality of the assets, but the business model, which made the bank face the LPHI 
risk. The Northern Rock was caught up with the drying up liquidity in the London 
markets and unable to issue its mortgage-backed securities, in other words, it was 
unable to cover its lending.  
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Due to the lack of liquidity in interbank money markets, banks‟ financing became 
more expensive internationally. Especially banks‟ long-term financing turned out 
to be more difficult because of the increased costs (RATA 2008a, 1). The avail-
ability for long-term finance still remained on a good level for Finnish banks, but 
changes in costs, made banks put more emphasis on short-term funding. Because 
of the substantial growth in Finnish banks‟ deposits, there has not been immediate 
need for long-term funding. (RATA, 2008b, 26.) For the same reason, Finnish 
banks have not been relying on short-term funding in the wholesale markets, but 
instead, short-term funds are received in the form of deposits. Because the short-
term funds can be received mostly this way, Finnish banks have not been heavily 
exposed to the market disruptions in the wholesale markets. 
 
The trust in Finnish banking sector has also kept the cost of finance on a tolerable 
level compared to many other foreign banks (RATA 2008a, 4). Overall Finnish 
banking system did not face difficulties with short or long-term finance and the 
surplus liquid reserves have been guaranteeing that banks can temporally handle 
even major market distractions (RATA 2008b, 26). Unlike, Finnish banks‟, 
Northern Rock‟s liquid reserves were not sufficient enough to handle the shock 
reactions experienced in the wholesale markets. 
 
As it was already established before in earlier sections, also the MD of Koitin Per-
tunmaan Op lists deposits as most important source of funds for Finnish banks. 
The MD of Koitin Pertunmaan Op believes that this will be the case also in the 
future. At least for smaller group member banks, sourcing funds in form of depos-
its has been a traditional business model. (MD of Koitin Pertunmaan Op 2011.) 
 
The explanation for why Finnish banking sector has not been relying on the 
wholesale markets in the same way than many foreign banks, can also been seen 
in the regulation of the Finnish banking sector. Banks are required to have long-
term finance to cover their long-term lending. The regulation is not only put into 
practice on behalf of Finnish Financial Supervisory Authority, but there are also 
internal regulation coming inside the bank. For example banks are required to 
calculate the interest rate risks on a monthly basis and ensure that the maturity of 
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deposits and other debt matches with the maturity of their receivables. (MD of 
Koitin Pertunmaan Op 2011.) 
 
The second clear explanation for the Finnish banks‟ deposit based funding can be 
found in the cost of borrowing. Deposits are still a much cheaper source of funds 
for banks than funding from the wholesale markets. However, even though the 
MD of Koitin Pertunmaan Op believes that the deposits will retain a crucial role 
in banks‟ funding strategies, it still seems to be so that the role of deposits in cov-
ering lending will decrease in the future. This is also when the borrowing from 
abroad steps into the picture. (MD of Koitin Pertunmaan Op 2011.) 
 
The question of why the pace of lending has not been exceeding the pace of de-
posits, the MD of Koitin Pertunmaan Op finds this a more difficult question to 
answer. All the loans, which are considered to be sound, have always been fi-
nanced. Still what has been different in 21
st
 century, compared to the 1990s, is that 
the debtors‟ ability to pay has been assessed more deeply. (MD of Koitin Pertun-
maan Op 2011.) 
 
Finnish Financial Supervisory Authority gives rules and regulations concerning 
the collaterals in credit granting. According to the MD of Koitin Pertunmaan Op, 
Finnish Financial Supervisory Authority has been requiring collaterals after the 
1990s, on a much higher level and even before the other countries started to pay 
attention on these matters. As an example, the loans of 100 % of mortgage values 
can be accepted only in very rare situations and on central basis the loan to value 
should be 70 %. This way the regulation has been controlling the excessive grant-
ing of credits. (MD of Koitin Pertunmaan Op 2011.) 
4.2.2 Deposit protection scheme 
 
Deposit insurance protection schemes in the UK and Finland have both gone 
through changes during the past years. In table 4, we can see the renewed deposit 
insurance limits and the dates when changes were made between the years 2007 
and 2011. As it was presented earlier, the first changes to the limit, in the UK, 
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were made in October 2007. When the crisis of Northern Rock occurred, it be-
came obvious that the limit of £31,700, covering fully the first £2,000 and then 
90% of the next £33,000 was not high enough to retain the depositors confidence 
that their money would be safe in bank‟s accounts (BBC 2010). At that time the 
Finnish deposit guarantee was 100 % deposit protection up to 25,000€.  
 
TABLE 4. Deposit insurance limits and changes made in 2007 – 2011 in the UK 
and Finland 
Date (UK) Payout limit (£) Date (Finland) Payout limit (€) 
- 31 700* - 25 000* 
Changes to deposit insurance limits in the United Kingdom and 
Finland in 2007 - 2011 
1.10.2007 35 000 - - 
7.10.2008 50 000 8.10.2008 50 000 
31.12.2010 85 000 1.1.2011 100 000 
 
*Original compensation limits  
 
Northern Rock‟s case proved the significance of a sufficient deposit insurance, 
when the bank cannot be trusted anymore by its depositors (Ruuskanen 2009, 92). 
The limited protection scheme together with the fact that it would take long time 
for depositors to get their compensation, have been presumed to be the reasons for 
the Northern Rock‟s banking run. (Haajanen 2008, according to Ruuskanen 2009, 
92.)  So eventually it was not the British deposit protection scheme, but the gov-
ernment‟s final promise to guarantee for all savers‟ money, which stopped the 
banking run (BBC 2010).  
 
The practical policy of a 100 % government guarantee was extended later on to 
savers in other banks that became insolvent or were in danger of becoming so. 
This cover included the Icelandic bank Kaupthing Edge, which also had a branch 
operating in Finland. Kaupthing‟s branch in Finland eventually ended up to be 
insolvent and taken over by its parent company.  In Finland there was a special 
arrangement made to pay out the deposits of the branch of Kaupthing Bank, when 
the three biggest Finnish banks; Nordea Bank Finland, OP-Pohjola Group and 
Sampo Bank committed to arranging funding (Kallonen 2008, 6). Finnish parlia-
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ment guaranteed participating banks against any legal risks in the arrangement 
with Kaupthing. This way it was fully a private-sector solution with no govern-
ment funds being used. (Mayer Brown LLP 2009.) 
 
In fact in Finland, the deposit protection was not used even during the most diffi-
cult times of the 1990s banking crisis. What Ruuskanen claimed, is that the cus-
tomers‟ and markets‟ confidence in banks, was so strong even during the crisis, 
that Finnish banks did not face banking runs. Even individual banks‟, such as 
Suomen Säästöpankki, deposit base remained rather stable, despite of all the nega-
tive publicity during the crisis. (Ruuskanen 2009, 90.) 
 
The Finnish guarantee fund was untouchable until 2010, when Finnish Sofia 
Bank‟s (Sofia Pankki) business license was revoked by the Finnish Financial Su-
pervisory Authority. This was done because Sofia bank‟s own funds fell below 
the minimum requirement of 5€ million. The Sofia Bank had been operating in the 
markets only from the beginning of 2009. (Kallonen 2011, 5.) This was the first 
time Finnish deposit guarantee fund was used to compensate depositors savings.  
Sofia Bank paid back 85 % of its liabilities to the depositors and money market 
investors and the rest of the remaining deposits were covered by the deposit guar-
antee fund up to 50,000€ (Aaltonen 2011, 24). This way the Sofia Bank‟s funds 
were frozen by the Finnish FSA before any possible consequences about the 
bank‟s insolvency started to emerge. 
 
In table 4, we can see that the changes to the deposits protection limits, in Finland 
and the UK, have been made around the same time and the limits for compensa-
tion payouts have not been differing remarkable. Also we can see that the UK 
made the first increases for the level of compensation already in 2007. The change 
was made soon after the crisis of Northern Rock.  
 
In the UK, the increases were driven by Northern Rock‟s crisis and evidences 
about lack of public confidence in the system, when depositors were defecting to 
Irish banks (Financial Services Net Ltd 2011). In Finland the first change up to 
50,000€ was made, in the wake of similar moves in other European countries and 
to ensure that the Finnish banks would not end up to be in unfavourable competi-
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tive position, because it would be lagging behind the other countries (Ruuskanen 
2009, 91). The latest increases for the level of compensations, 100,000€ in 
Finland and £85,000 in the UK, were a consequence of a Europe-wide require-
ment for each country to offer compensation equivalent to 100,000€ (BBC 2010).  
 
When asking about the role of the deposit protection, the MD of Koitin Pertun-
maan Op believes that the deposit protection guarantee has an important signifi-
cance among the public. However, deposit protection guarantee has its other side 
as well, if looking from the point of view of a banker. The MD of Koitin Pertun-
maan Op tells the following practical example concerning the case of Icelandic 
banks‟ branch Kaupthing. (MD of Koitin Pertunmaan Op 2011.) 
 
A few years ago some Icelandic banks entered Finnish financial markets, by 
promising higher interest rates than other Finnish banks. This was crucial for them 
to cope in a highly competitive Finnish deposit markets with other large Finnish 
banks. By promising higher interests, banks also took much greater risk. In that 
case if the bank fails, the deposits and also the interests would be paid out from 
the deposit guarantee fund. According to the MD of Koitin Pertunmaan Op this 
would distort the competition between the banks, because the large solvent Fin-
nish banks are maintaining the fund. And even though the new risky bank would 
have not made any payments to the fund, its depositors would still benefit from 
the protection guarantee – by not only getting their deposits, but also the high in-
terests. (MD of Koitin Pertunmaan Op 2011.) Therefore, the deposit guarantee 
fund has its more complex side as well. 
 
However, the MD of Koitin Pertunmaan Op believes that as a maintainer of public 
confidence and stability in the financial markets, the deposit protection fund has 
an important role. The MD of Koitin Pertunmaan Op also believes that deposit 
guarantee is efficient at preventing banking runs. The current compensation limit 
of 100,000€ he also finds high enough. The higher the limit arises, the higher the 
payments that banks have to make to the fund. (MD of Koitin Pertunmaan Op 
2011.) 
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Whether the deposit protection scheme should be reformed, the MD of Koitin 
Pertunmaan Op has his own opinion and goes back to the case of Kaupthing. In-
stead of guaranteeing the deposits and even the high interest fully, the compensa-
tion should only cover the deposits, or additionally the deposits and some fixed 
interest set by the regulatory authority. When questioning, whether the deposit 
guarantee should be more risk profiled or individually customised for the banks, 
the MD of Koitin Pertunmaan Op answers that this kind of procedure could be too 
difficult to put into practice. (MD of Koitin Pertunmaan Op 2011.) 
4.2.3 The lessons from the 1990s Finnish banking crisis 
 
The events of the 1990s banking crisis and the following banking reform acts and 
capital adequacy standards have been stated to be one of the reasons why Finland 
banking sector has managed to avoid the spilling effects of the latest global finan-
cial crisis. The acts accomplished in the 1990s to improve the soundness of the 
Finnish financial sector have made Finnish banks one of the most efficient banks 
in Europe. (Kauppi 2010.)  
 
Policy actions to overcome the Finnish banking crisis began in 1991, when the 
Bank of Finland took control of Skopbank. This was a consequence of drying up 
liquidity in the interbank markets, when other banks refused to accept certificates 
by Skopbank. This has been seen a necessary intervention as there was no other 
arrangement found in the markets to rescue the bank.  (Honkapohja 2009, 20-21.)  
 
Other policy actions followed, and the government granted public support to the 
banks in forms of capital certificates. All the banking groups excluding Ålands-
banken signed up for the government's bailout scheme. The bailout scheme was 
even extended more when the government in its role as a lender of last resort, 
promised that the obligations of the Finnish banking sector would be guaranteed 
under all circumstances. (Ruuskanen 2009, 106.) 
 
After the 1990s Finnish banking crisis there have been made several actions to 
improve the efficiency of the Finnish banking sector in the time of crisis and also 
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to prevent the future crises. The central acts have been related to the reforming of 
banking sector and reforming of regulation, where the most important ones have 
considered to be the reform of deposit guarantee scheme and strengthening the 
supervisory activities. (Ministry of Finance 1999.) 
  
As it was told before, the Finnish deposit guarantee scheme got its current form in 
1998, when the reform of the deposit bank legislation was put into practice. At 
that time the Deposit Guarantee Fund was established to protect the deposits and 
as a requirement all the deposit-taking banks had to become members of the fund 
(Ministry of Finance 1999). Before this and during the most difficult years of the 
banking crisis the Parliament had given a promise to guarantee all the deposits in 
all circumstances (Ruuskanen 2009, 87). The reform transferred the responsibility 
to the banks, because the authorised banks themselves arrange also the funding. 
(Ministry of Finance 1999.) 
 
Another major reform act concerned the supervision of banking sector. At that 
time the former Financial Supervision Authority was established and the Insur-
ance Supervisory Authority went through some organisational changes (Ministry 
of Finance 1999). The responsibilities undertaken by these authorities were then 
later transferred under the one newly established organisation, Finnish Financial 
Supervisory Authority. 
 
During the 1990s Finnish banking sector has also gone through many structural 
changes. By the year 1998 there had been altogether five different mergers be-
tween the banks. As a result nowadays about 60 per cent of the Finnish banking 
system is owned by foreigners almost 80 per cent of banking operations in the 
Finnish markets have been shared between the three largest banking groups 
(Ruuskanen 2009, 106). Two of the largest banking groups, Nordea Bank and 
Sampo Bank are mostly foreign owned, whereas the third largest, OP-Pohjola is 
domestic-owned. 
 
As it was noted above, one of the biggest changes as a consequence of the 1990s 
banking crisis was the structural reform of Finnish banking sector. The MD of 
Koitin Pertunmaan Op finds this as one of the most important reforming acts 
 46 
 
made by the government, because this way the “troublemakers” such as Skopbank 
were removed from the markets (MD of Koitin Pertunmaan Op 2011). 
 
Another central issue changed after the years of crisis, has been the excessive 
credit granting, which was discussed also in earlier theme. As the MD of Koitin 
Pertunmaan Op had stated before, the Finnish Financial Supervisory Authority 
has been requiring collaterals, which has been one of the central issues changed as 
a consequence of the 1990s crisis. Also this has resulted that the creditworthiness 
of the customers has been assessed more deeply. As if the pace of lending would 
had continued on a same level all the way to the 21
st
 century, the consequences of 
current crisis would had been much deeper as well. (MD of Koitin Pertunmaan Op 
2011.) 
 
As it is characteristic, after every recession follows an upswing. Therefore after 
the 1990s banking crisis Finnish economy was recovering, demand for finance 
increased and credit losses were diminished. This way Finnish banks became 
more solvent and liquid and trust in banking sector was also returned. (MD of 
Koitin Pertunmaan Op 2011.) 
 
Above all, the 1990s has taught especially more prudent behaviour to the bankers. 
If today‟s knowledge would had been in bankers‟ use in the years before the 
1990s crisis, Finland could had avoided such a serious recession, - despite of the 
fact that the banking crisis had several other reasons as well, such as the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and problems related to the value of Finnish old currency, 
Finnish Markka. However, the 1990s banking crisis gave several lessons espe-
cially to the corporate governances, which the MD of Koitin Pertunmaan Op finds 
one of the main reasons that have been enhancing the Finnish banking survival in 
the latest financial crisis. (MD of Koitin Pertunmaan Op 2011.) 
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4.2.4 Public confidence 
 
Keasey and Veronesi (2008) presented the following hypothesis highlighting the 
importance of market confidence. “If depositors have confidence in the banks, the 
retained fund can be as low as 5 -10 per cent. However if depositors lose the con-
fidence in the banks, through poor lending or suspicions that depositor demands 
will not be met, anything less than 100 % per cent retention may be insufficient. 
Of course, banks can also borrow from other banks, but if other banks also have 
doubts about the liquidity of another banks, then these sources of funds will also 
dry up”. (Keasey & Veronesi 2008, 10.) This argument highlights the role of 
bank‟s own strategic choices as a maintainer of public confidence. 
 
It cannot be said that in history Finnish banks would have been reaching for pub-
lic confidence by their own strategic choices. Among many others, economic pro-
fessor of London Business School, David Currie criticised the lending decisions 
of Finnish banks before the 1990s banking crisis. There was an extraordinary ex-
plosion with foreign currency borrowing, when Finnish individuals and compa-
nies were granted credits in foreign currency. And what Currie presented was that 
the actions of banks were only encouraging this kind of borrowing, even though 
professional bankers‟ should have been more aware of the risks of this kind of 
lending. (Currie 1993, 100.) 
 
Yet, as it was mentioned before, the Finnish banks did not experience banking 
runs during the 1990s crisis, -and government had also guaranteed the deposits in 
all circumstances. Ruuskanen in turn argues, that ever since the end of war, cus-
tomers have been able to trust that their deposits in the banks are always safe. This 
“de facto” –deposit guarantee Ruuskanen talks about, was not defined in legisla-
tion, but the markets did believe its existence. (Ruuskanen 2009, 89.)  
 
In Northern Rock‟s case the belief in the government guarantees did not appear to 
be the same. Before formalising the actual full guarantee of deposits, Bank of 
England was worried about the impact of its actions on future crisis. Also the de-
positors were failed to reassure in a timely manner. (Keasey and Veronesi 2008, 
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17.) It can be seen that there existed an uncertainty about the government guaran-
tees of deposits.  
 
Before the turmoil of the latest global financial crisis the financial markets were 
holding surplus liquidity, which was available at a cheap price, investors‟ risk 
aversion was high and new financial instruments were diversifying risks in the 
markets efficiently. Later on when the US subprime-customers started to fail in 
their obligations, the risks in the markets aroused, yet no one knew the actual lo-
cation and size of these risk concentrations. This created a serious lack of confi-
dence when the banks stopped lending to each other. The situation caused many 
write offs in banks, which had been investing in these mortgage backed securities. 
(Rata 2008a, 30.) 
 
During the crisis the trust in Finnish banks has remained strong and banks have 
been able to borrow from the markets with a reasonable price. The reason for this 
has been stated to be in the fact that Finnish banks did not invest large amounts in 
subprime assets. (Rata 2008b, 3.) Another reason for the good level of confidence 
has been the good credit rating of Finnish banks. Because of the good credit rating 
Finnish bonds have been selling well in the markets and this way banks have not 
been facing remarkable difficulties with their funding. (Kallonen 2011, 10.) 
 
However, after the turmoil of financial crisis, several doubts have aroused in the 
markets. Like it was established before, the good credit rating of Northern Rock‟s 
assets did not prevent the drying up liquidity in its short-term money markets.  
As well as in several cases agencies have been giving over optimistic ratings to 
the banks, which have been driven into serious difficulties and bankruptcies. An-
other conflict concerns the way that credit rating agencies operate, since they are 
paid for their services. In the light of the latest events, the trustworthy of credit 
rating agencies has been widely questioned. (Alvarez 2009, 10.) 
 
Therefore we might ask what makes the Finnish banks so special that the confi-
dence has remained among the investors and interbank markets. The MD of 
Koitin Pertunmaan Op believes that also in this case, the Finnish banks‟ strong 
deposit base covering most of the lending plays a big role as a maintainer of con-
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fidence. The MD of Koitin Pertunmaan Op highlights also the significance of col-
laterals, which have been required on a higher level within the last two decades. 
(MD of Koitin Pertunmaan Op 2011.) 
 
Another matter the MD of Koitin Pertunmaan Op mentions as a maintainer of 
confidence are new European banks‟ stress tests. Despite of the fact that even 
these tests have been criticised about the way they measure the risks, the MD of 
Koitin Pertunmaan Op believes that they still have brought more positive public-
ity to the Finnish banks. For example OP-Pohjola was on the list among the ten 
best banks. (MD of Koitin Pertunmaan Op 2011.) Also other Finnish banks have 
been successful in stress tests. 
 
The MD of Koitin Pertunmaan Op also presents a new, more interesting perspec-
tive to the natures of Finnish and British banking. After listening to several bank-
ing seminars in London, there is evidence about the missing concept of  “bank 
loyalty” in British banking markets. By this he means that the actual incomes and 
loans of the households can be in different accounts and banks. Also the bank, 
which is granting the credit, does not even require their clients to centralise their 
money matters into one bank. The MD of Koitin Pertunmaan Op sees bank loyalty 
as an important feature in Finnish banking. If customer has been as a customer in 
the same bank for ten years, there is not that easily a reason for switching a bank. 
This way the trust in the bank also can remain stronger and also banks know their 
customers better. (MD of Koitin Pertunmaan Op 2011.) 
 
In the scenario where the interbank markets would close up, even Finnish banks 
would not survive for a long time without borrowing. Even though the deposits 
are covering most of lending, there are not enough of them to share between all 
the market operators. Also due to the increased cost of lending, banks would be 
forced to seek for finance from the central bank. However, at this current situation 
there is no need for that, especially for smaller group member banks, which have 
been covering their lending fully by the deposits. In the future the situation might 
be different and funding from the wholesale markets needed, especially if the pace 
of lending and deposits are continuing their growth. (MD of Koitin Pertunmaan 
Op 2011.) 
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As it was told before, even Finnish banking markets have been close to the crisis 
due to the lack of confidence against Icelandic Kaupthing bank in 2008. The MD 
of Koitin Pertunmaan Op believes that if the emerging crisis of Kaupthing would 
have gone further it might had been a catastrophic situation for all of the banks in 
Finland. If people start to believe that they possibly are not able to get their depos-
its back, the public confidence will disappear quickly in the markets. Therefore 
also the consequences could have been much worse. The cost of Kaupthing‟s sav-
ing operation was low price compared to that if the public stopped trusting in 
banks‟ ability to pay back their claims. (MD of Koitin Pertunmaan Op 2011.) 
4.3 Findings and conclusions 
 
In earlier sections the key factors of the successful Finnish banking performance, 
were approached by collecting data from four different themes; banks‟ funding 
and lending strategies, deposit protection scheme, the lessons from the 1990s Fin-
nish banking crisis and public confidence. In this section the data presented is 
analysed more deeply and the reasoning for the key factors is provided. Also the 
final answers are given to the research questions set in the beginning of this thesis. 
 
In the first theme banks' funding and lending strategies were discussed in the light 
of Northern Rock's case. The crucial characteristic in Northern Rock‟s business 
strategy was to rely heavily on wholesale funding, covering most of its lending 
with short-term borrowing. 
 
Finnish banks' funding and lending strategies are unquestionably strengths of Fin-
nish banking model. This is because public deposits have been covering most of 
the lending and therefore the Finnish banks have not been exposed to the funding 
risk as highly than many other foreign banks. Especially during the crisis deposits 
have remained stable and safe source of funding for banks. In turn, collateral re-
quirements coming from the Financial Supervisory Authority and banks them-
selves have been preventing efficiently excessive credit granting, balancing the 
growth rates between lending and borrowing. 
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Within the time, deposits are losing their meaning as a source of funding leading 
to that the wholesale funding becomes more general also for Finnish banks. How-
ever, financial regulation can prevent the risk exposure, by demanding long-term 
finance to cover long-term lending. Another matter in the future is to ensure the 
sufficient liquidity reserves in the banks. New Basel III requires banks to hold 
more liquidity as well as long term finance. This way the new Basel accord aims 
to prevent a future crisis, by not encouraging banks to rely on short-term whole-
sale funding, which is an easy option when the markets are liquid but very dan-
gerous strategy, when illiquid.  
 
The Northern Rock's crisis proved the importance of a sufficient deposit protec-
tion insurance. The results of desk study and interview both indicated that among 
the public the deposit protection has an important meaning and at least on its cur-
rent level it can prevent banking runs. During the 1990s banking crisis banking 
runs were avoided due to the government‟s full guarantee of all existing deposits. 
However, the latest financial crisis and the crisis of Kaupthing bank proved that a 
banking run could occur even in Finland.  
 
The question arises, whether the deposit protection can never be efficient enough 
without a full guarantee of all existing deposits. The crisis of Northern Rock and 
the 1990s Finnish banking crisis, as well as the emerged panic among the Kaup-
thing‟s depositors, would suggest that the answer is no, or at least that the protec-
tion limit has not been always high enough.  
 
However, as Mutikainen (1998) among many others presented, several moral haz-
ard problems arise if the guarantee is total. Therefore the total insurance can en-
courage the public and banks to more risky behaviour, when in the case of the 
banking failure, deposits and also interests earned, would always be fully guaran-
teed. The crisis of Kaupthing bank has showed that even smaller deposit guarantee 
can have several moral hazard consequences, because it does not take into account 
the riskiness of banks‟ own strategies. The current deposit limit of 100,000€ is 
undoubtedly high enough to retain the public confidence, but the aforementioned 
problems may be worth of consideration.  
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Nevertheless, the banking runs have been managed to avoid in Finland. However, 
the actual deposit protection scheme probably cannot be found as a reason for the 
successful Finnish banking performance. Still, the deposits have always become 
guaranteed, one way or another. The Finnish financial stability has been retained 
due to the supervisory authorities‟, government‟s and banking sectors‟ ability to 
respond quickly to the emerging crisis. 
 
The lessons learnt from the earlier crisis have been an advantage for Finland when 
entering the late 2000s financial crisis. In general, the events of the 1990s have 
taught Finnish banking sector prudence, which has unquestionably been a key 
factor in Finnish banking performance during the latest financial crisis. Banking 
sectors' structural reform, improved solvency and liquidity, banks' tightened su-
pervision and self-regulation in lending activities, as well as prudence of the cor-
porate governance, are one of the most important outcomes of the 1990s Finnish 
banking crisis. If the questioned banking strategies had not been brought into the 
light at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Finnish banking sector 
would have been much deeper in the crisis during the late 2000s. 
 
In history public confidence in Finland has been maintained by extreme govern-
ment acts and interventions in the emerging crisis. Also the Finnish banking sec-
tor's acts in the events of the crisis have proved that the public confidence is an 
on-going concern for all the banks, not just for the government and supervisory 
authorities. The market-based solutions combined with the government support 
are evidence of efficient Finnish financial markets, which should be desired in 
other economies as well. 
 
Small risk concentrations related to the subprime investments and good credit 
rating may strengthen the public confidence, but are palpably not the main factors 
at maintaining the confidence. In this case as well, the banks' business strategy is 
what matters. Finnish banks' strategies have not been revealing questionable char-
acteristics, but instead funding and lending have been based on safe deposit fund-
ing and collateral lending. However, in the future the role of wholesale funding 
will increase by bringing more challenges for retaining the confidence in the mar-
kets. 
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Also worth mentioning is the concept of „bank loyalty‟ as a maintainer of public 
confidence. This new interesting perspective was brought up during the interview. 
The concept of „bank loyalty‟ has traditionally had a central role in Finnish bank-
ing and is advantageous not only because customers focus their money matters 
into one bank, but also because it helps bank to know their customers better and 
the customers remain more loyal for their banks. This way bank loyalty is enhanc-
ing the confidence between the banks and their customers and might be worth of 
closer consideration at enhancing the public confidence.  
 
The main object of this thesis was to look for an answer to the question “What 
were the key factors for the successful performance of Finnish banking institu-
tions in the late 2000s global financial crisis?”. Based on the crisis of British bank 
Northern Rock, the answers to this question can be addressed as follows: 
 
 Finnish banks‟ funding and lending strategies have not been exposing 
them to the risks as heavily as many other foreign banks. 
 Supervisory authorities have been supervising banking sector efficiently 
and paying attention to collateral requirements and long-term finance 
 Finnish banking sector has been paying attention to the riskiness of their 
own operations (e.g. maturity risk) also through banks' own internal regu-
lation. 
 Government and supervisory authorities have succeeded in their core func-
tion to retain the public confidence in the markets by reacting fast to the 
market shocks. 
 Finnish banking sector has proved its efficiency by providing unprompted 
market-based solutions to retain the public confidence in the markets. 
 Banking sectors' structural reform, improved solvency and liquidity, en-
hanced supervision and regulation, as well as prudence of the corporate 
governance have been one of the most important outcomes of the 1990s 
Finnish banking crisis. This all has been strengthening the Finnish banking 
sector before entering the late 2000s financial crisis. 
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The answers to the sub question, “What has the financial crisis taught us about the 
banking and its regulation?” can be provided as follows: 
 
 The role of the deposits as a source of funds should be highlighted more. 
 Relying on short-term wholesale funding exposes banks to liquidity and 
funding risks, therefore there needs to be more focus on banks' liquidity 
and funding risk management. 
 Banks‟ liquidity and long-term finance needs to be revised more effi-
ciently on behalf of the authorities and banks themselves. 
 The deposit protection scheme in its current state can distort competition 
and would be worth reviewing.  
 
Based on the findings of this thesis, the last sub question “Could the Finnish bank-
ing model help to prevent future banking failures?” can finally be answered to as 
follows: 
 
Finnish banking model has proved to be working efficiently regardless of the eco-
nomic state the country has been suffering due to the 2000s financial crisis. There-
fore the Finnish banking model could be worth a closer examination in an attempt 
to prevent a future crisis. However, it is good to bear in mind that also the Finnish 
banks‟ strategies are changing over the time. Therefore the future brings more 
challenges also for the Finnish banking sector and the riskiness of its business 
strategies need to be reviewed continuously by supervision authorities and banks‟ 
themselves.  
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5 SUMMARY 
 
The objective and main research problem of this thesis was to look for reasoning 
for the successful Finnish banking performance during the late 2000s global fi-
nancial crisis. The hypothesis of the thesis was that the bank‟s performance de-
pends on its own strategic choices rather than external shocks. The reasoning for 
this could be found by evaluating the factors, which led to the banking run of a 
British bank, Northern Rock. Therefore there has been clear evidence, how a 
bank‟s aggressive business strategies can heavily expose them to the effects of 
market disruptions. In addition to the main research problem, this thesis also 
aimed to evaluate what the latest crisis has taught us about banking and its regula-
tions, and whether the Finnish banking model could help at preventing future 
banking failures.  
 
In the first theoretical section the general structure of the banking environment 
was presented, by clarifying how the banks operate in financial markets. The sec-
ond theoretical section introduced the background of the late 2000s global finan-
cial crisis, the case of Northern Rock and finally gave an overview to the Finnish 
economy and banking performance. In the empirical part the research problems 
were approached from four different aspects; banks‟ funding and lending strate-
gies, deposit protection scheme, the lessons from the 1990s Finnish banking crisis 
and public confidence.   
 
The empirical study resulted in discovering several reasons for the successful Fin-
nish banking performance. One of the main key factors has been Finnish banks‟ 
funding and lending strategies, which have proven to be stable even in market 
disruptions. Also the risks have been managed efficiently through Finnish banks‟ 
internal supervision as well as on behalf of the Finnish Financial Supervisory Au-
thority. The emerging crises have been prevented and public confidence in the 
markets retained by exceptional intervention and support acts coming from the 
government, financial authorities and banks themselves. Also the 1990s banking 
crisis led to most of the reforming and strengthening acts that have made Finnish 
banks stable to face the crisis. 
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The latest financial crisis has given several lessons for banks‟ business strategies. 
The crisis has proved the importance of deposits as a source of funds, because 
short-term wholesale funding can expose banks to the markets shocks more easily. 
Therefore banks‟ funding strategies would need to be revised more efficiently. In 
empirical study it was also established that the deposit protection scheme would 
be worth reviewing. Finally taking into account the overall Finnish banking per-
formance, it has been established that Finnish banking model could be worth a 
closer examination in an attempt to prevent future crises. 
 
The subject of this thesis has been very challenging and required a lot of back-
ground research. The late 2000s financial crisis has been widely discussed but 
there has been actually very little concentration on the reasons behind the Finnish 
banking success. Therefore the thesis can be seen as successful, because it has 
provided some new aspects to the discussion about the Finnish banking sector‟s 
successful performance. The thesis also presented some criticism, which came up 
especially during the discussion about the deposit protection scheme.   
 
When evaluating the reliability of the research results, it must be kept in mind that 
part of the material, such as data collected from literature and interviews are pre-
senting only one person‟s opinion. So if the same interview questions were pre-
sented to different people, the answers might vary slightly. In this thesis the re-
sults were partly based on the individual banker‟s opinions. However, the data 
presented has been well reasoned and different sources used in the research proc-
ess are rather supporting than arguing with each other. Also the sources and pre-
senters of the data have been clearly pointed out in the text, so that the readers 
could evaluate the reliability of the content by themselves. The recording of the 
interview also increases the reliability of this study. It has been the author‟s aim to 
transcribe and translate the interview answers as exactly as possible. 
 
The objective of this thesis was to investigate what were the key factors for suc-
cessful Finnish banking performance in the late 2000s financial crisis and whether 
the performance can be explained with an example of a foreign bank. The answers 
to these questions were provided and the thesis managed to reach its goals set in 
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the beginning. Therefore the thesis can be seen as valid. The research results of 
this thesis have been based on individual study about the performance of Finnish 
banking sector. So what comes to the generalisation of this thesis, it can be said 
that the results are applicable only inside the Finnish banking sector.  
 
As a future proposal, it would be interesting and worthwhile to investigate more 
closely the Finnish deposit protection scheme. Deposit guarantee has traditionally 
been one of the main tools at maintaining the public confidence in banks. How-
ever, as was established in this thesis, during the latest crisis several doubts arose 
about the efficiency of the deposit protection scheme to prevent a crisis. This the-
sis provided some consideration about the efficiency of the deposit protection 
from a banker‟s point of view. As a future proposal for examination, it would be 
interesting to investigate, how efficient and reliable the public sees the deposit 
protection guarantee and how many people are actually aware of the existence of 
such a protection.  
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APPENDIX 1. Theme interview – the body 
 
1. What have been the key factors for the successful Finnish banking per-
formance in the late 2000s financial crisis? 
 
 
FINNISH BANKS‟ FUNDING AND LENDING STRATEGIES 
 
1. What have been the main characteristics of Finnish banks‟ funding strate-
gies in the latest financial crisis? 
 
2. What has the latest financial crisis taught us about the importance of the 
strategic choices concerning banks‟ funding? 
 
 What should be paid more attention to in the future? (Deposit 
base, other short-term funding, long term funding, etc.…) Will 
the funding strategies be the same in the future? 
 
3. What could be an explanation for the fact that, unlike many other foreign 
banks, Finnish banks have not been granting credits excessively, even 
though the times before the crisis were in an economic boom? 
 
4. How would it be possible to respond to the increasing demand for credits, 
without the bank having to cover its lending with more risky and expen-
sive short-term finance in the wholesale markets? (E.g. by securitising) 
 
 
FINNISH DEPOSIT PROTECTION SCHEME 
 
1. What is the significance of the deposit protection fund in maintaining pub-
lic confidence? 
 
2. Is the deposit protection scheme efficient enough to maintain public confi-
dence in emerging crises? (E.g. there is clear evidence in UK, that it does 
not work if not 100 % guarantee) 
 Is the current compensation limit high enough / too high? 
 
3. Should the deposit protection be changed or developed more?  
 If the answer is yes, how? 
 
 
 2 
 
 
THE LESSONS FROM THE 1990S FINNISH BANKING CRISIS 
 
1. What could be the most important lessons learnt from the 1990s Finnish 
banking crisis, when thinking about the latest financial crisis? 
 
2. What were the central issues changed as a consequence of the 1990s bank-
ing crisis? How did these affect Finnish banking policy? 
 Can it be stated that the banking sector reform after the 1990s 
banking crisis has been the one and only reason to explain the 
more successful Finnish banking performance during the latest 
financial crisis? 
 
 
PUBLIC CONFIDENCE 
 
1. What could be an explanation for the high level of public confidence in the 
Finnish banking sector during the financial crisis? 
 
2. What makes Finnish banks so special that the confidence has remained on 
a high level even in interbank markets? (Other than good credit ratings) 
 
3. Could it be possible that Finland would face the same kind of lack of con-
fidence as many other foreign banks and what kind of (worst possible) 
consequences it could have for the banks‟ funding? 
 
4. What kind of operations could be accomplished to enhance public confi-
dence during a time of crisis? 
 
